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Introduction
The finances of state and local pension plans are 
headline news almost daily.1  Indeed, although these 
plans were moving toward prefunding their promised 
benefits, two financial crises in 10 years have thrown 
them seriously off course.  Measured by the standards 
of the Government Accounting Standards Board, 
between 2008 and 2009 the ratio of assets to liabilities 
for our sample of 126 plans dropped from 84 percent 
to 79 percent.  But this decline is only the beginning 
of the bad news that will emerge as the losses are 
spread over the next several years.  Furthermore, the 
funded levels are closer to 50 percent if liabilities are 
discounted by a riskless rate, as recommended by 
economists and financial experts.2  What do these 
numbers imply for the future of these plans?   
Here’s what’s happening.  States and localities 
have increased contributions and extended retirement 
ages for new employees, but these changes will take 
a long time to have any substantial effect.  In most 
states, constitutional protections and court rulings 
have prohibited public employers from cutting ben-
efits for existing employees.3  Thus, the only option 
for a quick fix would be an infusion of tax revenues.  
But the recession has decimated tax revenues and in-
creased the demand for state and local services.  Thus, 
the question is whether these plans have enough as-
sets to muddle along until the economy and the stock 
market recover.  Or do they face a liquidity crisis?  
That is the subject of this brief.
The discussion is as follows.  The first section 
looks at the simple ratio of assets to benefits over 
time and across plans in 2009.  The second section 
moves to a more dynamic approach and investigates 
two concepts for estimating when plans would run 
out of money.  Under a “termination” concept, where 
benefits earned to date and plan assets are put in an 
“old” plan and normal cost payments cover all future 
accruals, most plans have enough assets to last for 
at least 15 years.  Under a more realistic “ongoing” 
framework, where normal costs are used to cover 
benefit payments, most plans have enough for at least 
30 years.
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Source: Authors’ calculations from Public Plans Database 
(PPD), 2001-2009. 
Assets to Benefits
The simplest place to start investigating the liquidity 
issue is to look at the ratio of plan assets to benefits.  
This ratio shows for how many years plans could – 
with no further investment returns, no additional 
contributions, and no growth in benefits – continue 
to pay benefits.  Figure 1 reveals that, in 2001, assets 
were 24 times annual benefit payments, suggesting 
that – with money on hand – state and local plans 
in the aggregate could continue to pay benefits for 
24 years.  In the wake of the bursting of the dot.com 
bubble, this ratio dropped to 19-20 years and stabi-
lized at this level for several years.  It was likely poised 
to rebound when the financial crisis of 2008 hit.  The 
ratio now stands at 13 (see Figure 1).  
Figure 1. Market Assets of Public Plans over 
Annual Benefit Payments, 2001-2009
As one would expect, plans are distributed around 
that average ratio.  One plan – Kentucky ERS – has 
a ratio of five, and 31 plans – including several large 
plans – have ratios between six and 10 (see Figure 2).  
While the simple ratio is useful for describing 
trends over time, in fact plan sponsors will continue 
to make contributions, plans will earn returns on 
their assets, and benefit payments will grow as the 
baby boom retires.  Therefore, given realistic assump-
tions, how long before plans run out of money? 
Estimating Exhaustion Dates
The answer to this question depends on how the exer-
cise is structured.  One approach is to adopt a “termi-
nation” framework.4  This framework involves putting 
benefits earned to date and existing assets in an “old” 
plan and creating a “new” plan in which all accruing 
benefits are covered by future normal-cost contribu-
tions.5  The new plan will be fine because it has no 
hangover liability and contributions will be set aside 
to cover accruing costs.  The old plan, however, is un-
derfunded and, without additional contributions, will 
ultimately run out of money.  The question is when?  
The answer clearly depends on investment returns.  
Calculating accrued benefits based on the methodol-
ogy described in Appendix A, we find that the exhaus-
tion date for the state-local sector as a whole is 2023 
with returns of 6 percent and 2033 with returns of 
8 percent (see Table 1 on the next page).6  These are 
similar to widely publicized numbers presented in a 
series of recent papers.7   
The alternative approach is to treat the plans as 
ongoing entities.  This approach requires a projec-
tion of actual benefit payments for current and future 
employees (see Appendix A) and the assumption that 
plan sponsors can use future normal-cost contribu-
tions to cover benefit payments.  Under the ongoing 
scenario, the exhaustion dates are 2025 with returns 
of 6 percent and 2041 with returns of 8 percent.8  Of 
course, using normal costs to cover benefits rather 
than accumulating payments in anticipation of future 
payments will worsen the funded status of plans.  
Source: Authors’ calculations from 2009 PPD.
Figure 2. Distribution of Plans by Market Assets 
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But if the issue is strictly one of plans running out 
of money, then using normal costs to cover future 
benefits must be considered.  
Under either the termination approach or the 
ongoing approach, the exhaustion dates for individual 
plans are widely distributed around the aggregate ex-
haustion dates.  Figure 3 shows estimated exhaustion 
dates under each scenario for each of the 126 plans 
in our sample, assuming the 8-percent return (see 
Appendix B for individual plan data).  As expected, 
the ongoing scenario shows far fewer plans exhaust-
ing their assets in the next 15 years, suggesting that 
plans have more breathing room than the termination 
approach suggests.  Even in the ongoing framework, 
however, several large plans run out of assets in 
the next 15 years.  These plans include Connecticut 
SERS, Illinois SERS, Illinois Universities, Kentucky 
ERS, Louisiana Teachers, New York City Teachers, 
and Rhode Island ERS.9  Benefits will be paid because 
they are contractual obligations of the employer, but 
the money will have to come from general revenues 
rather than the pension fund.  
Conclusion
Most state and local plans had made great strides 
in improving their funding discipline and manage-
ment in recent decades, so they had a relatively solid 
foundation in place before the two financial crises hit.  
For that reason, even after the worst market crash in 
decades, state and local plans do not face an immedi-
ate liquidity crisis.
Note: Assumes an 8-percent return.
Source: Authors’ estimates from 2009 PPD. 
Figure 3. Percent of State and Local Plans  

































Table 1. Exhaustion Dates for State and Local  
Pensions under a “Termination” and an “Ongoing” 
Framework by Rate of Return
Rate of return
6 percent 2023 2025
8 percent 2033 2041
Framework
Ongoing Termination
Note: “Ongoing” assumes that plans pay the normal cost in 
future years and these monies are available to cover benefit 
payments for current and future employees.  “Termination” 
assumes that assets and benefits earned to date are put 
into an “old” plan and normal cost payments cover all new 
accruals.  
Source: Authors’ estimates from 2009 PPD. 
Using a stringent “termination” framework, in 
which assets and benefits earned to date are put into 
an “old” plan and normal cost payments cover all new 
accruals, most plans will be able to cover benefit pay-
ments for the next 15 years, although some notable 
exceptions exist.  
Using a more realistic “ongoing” framework, in 
which normal costs are used to cover benefit pay-
ments, most plans have enough for at least 30 years.  
And these estimates are conservative.  They are based 
on 2009 data and therefore do not reflect the run-up 
in the stock market in the last year.  They also do 
not incorporate recent efforts to increase employee 
contributions and reduce benefits for new employees.  
And they assume that states pay only the normal cost 
when many make the full annual required contribu-
tion.  
In short, most public plans appear to have time to 
muddle through, although notable exceptions include 
Connecticut SERS, Illinois SERS, Illinois Universi-
ties, Kentucky ERS, Louisiana Teachers, New York 
City Teachers, and Rhode Island ERS.
In the end, however, the future outlook of public 
pensions, just as with private investors, is closely tied 
to the recovery of the economy and the stock market. APPENDICESIssue in Brief 5
Appendix A – Methodology
The model estimates the dates when the 126 plans in our sample may exhaust their assets by projecting future 
pension payments under two scenarios.  In the first scenario, it predicts how long assets on hand today could 
fund future pension payments under a “termination” framework, which involves putting benefits earned to 
date and the existing assets in an “old” plan and creating a “new” plan in which all accruing benefits are cov-
ered by future normal cost contributions.  In the second scenario, it predicts the solvency of the system in an 
ongoing scenario that allows for new entrants into the plan, continued benefit accruals for active employees, 
and contributions made to fund the system.  Determining exhaustion dates also requires projecting annual as-
set levels and normal costs for these same plans.
Project Annual Benefit Payments
To determine the annual benefit payments, the model must:
1)  Project the age and annual benefit payment at the time of retirement for each active participant.
2)  Calculate the benefit payment received by current retirees.
3)  Estimate the life expectancy of current and future retirees.
To this end, the model requires detailed information in three categories: demographics, actuarial assumptions, 
and plan design.  The demographic data include the number of active members and current retirees in each 
plan, the average salaries and tenure of active members of different ages, and the average benefit received by 
retirees of different ages.  Assumptions pertain to rate of return, turnover, vesting, mortality, and salary growth.  
The plan design data include the employee contribution rate, benefit formula, and COLA provisions.  We apply 
the actual plan-specific assumptions for the 14 largest plans.  We assign smaller plans one of the 14 sets of as-
sumptions by comparing calculated liabilities under each of the 14 assumption sets to the plan’s own reported 
liability.  
In each year, an active member of a plan will either continue working, separate, retire, or die.  At time t, the 
number of individuals, by birth cohort i, remaining in the plan is 
popi,t = popi,t − 1 * (1 − morti,t − 1) * (1 − sepi,t −1) * (1 − reti,t −1)
the number of individuals who separate is equal to  
separatesi,t = popi,t − 1 * (1 − morti,t − 1) * (sepi,t −1)
and the number of individuals who retire is equal to
retireesi,t = popi,t − 1 * (1 − morti,t − 1) * (reti,t −1)
where popi,t, sepi,t, and reti,t are the number of members, mortality, separation, and retirement probabilities, 
respectively, for cohort i at time t. 
When an individual separates, his accrued tenure, salary history, and separation date are stored.  Those who 
separate are also assigned a survival probability from their date of separation until retirement age.  The starting 
pension benefit, S, for person n of birth cohort i who separates from the plan at time t is given by 
    
Si,n = a * tenurei,n,t * Wi,n,t * P(t) * 1(tenurei,n ≥ vesting period)Center for Retirement Research 6
where a is the plan’s accrual rate, tenurei,n,t is the accrued years of service at the time of separation, Wi,n,t is the 
plan-specific average of the highest annual wages received at separation, and P(t) is the probability of living 
from time t until retirement.  The vesting period is a plan-specific input and 1(.) is an indicator function that 
takes the value of 0 if false and 1 if true.  
Benefits for individuals who work until retirement age are computed in a similar manner.  The starting benefit 
for an individual, m, of birth cohort i, who retires from the plan at time t is
Ri,m,t = a * tenurei,m,t * Wi,m,t
where a is the plan’s accrual rate and tenurei,m,t is the accrued years of service at the time of retirement.  
To calculate the benefit in the termination scenario, Wi,t is the plan-specific average of the highest annual wages 
received by person n or m in 2009; tenurei,t is the accrued years of service as of 2009.  To calculate the benefit in 
the ongoing scenario, Wi,t is the plan-specific average of the highest annual wages to be received by a person at 
the age of separation.
In the ongoing scenario, new hires replace employees who separate, retire, or die.  The total workforce grows 
over time according to growtht−1 (U.S. Census Bureau).
popi,t =  popi,t − 1 * (1 − morti,t − 1) * (1 − sepi,t −1) * (1 − reti,t −1)
                                                     + (popi,t − 1 − (* popi,t − 1 * (1 − morti,t − 1) * (1 − sepi,t −1) * (1 − reti,t −1)))  * growtht −1
The age distribution of new hires reflects those reported in the Actuarial Valuations of the 14 largest plans. 
In total, the benefit paid to birth cohort i reaching retirement at time t are equal to 
Benefiti,t =      Si,n +      Ri,m
In each subsequent year, the expected value of the cohort’s total benefit is equal to the previous year’s payment 
multiplied by the plan-specific cost-of-living adjustment and the survival probability of living to the next year.  
Benefiti,t = Benefiti,t − 1 * (1 + COLA) * (1 − morti,t − 1)
Total future payments to active workers made by the pension plan in a given year are then equal to 
Bt =       Benefiti,t * 1 (i ≥ minimum retirement age at time t)
where 1(.) is the indicator function that takes the value of 0 if false and 1 if true.
Current retirees are treated similarly to active employees.  The PPD records the total benefits paid to retired 
employees in 2009 and the proportion of those benefits paid to retirees of different ages.  The model assumes 
that, in each subsequent year, the expected value of each retiree birth cohort’s total benefit is equal to the previ-
ous year’s payment multiplied by the plan-specific cost-of-living adjustment and the survival probability of 
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Project Annual Asset Levels
Each year, a plan’s assets increase with new contributions and income earned.  Its assets decrease with the 
benefits it pays.  The model assumes that plans receive contributions and pay benefits at two points during the 
year.  Accordingly,
Assetst = (Assetst − 1 * (1 + r)) +                *           +             
where r is the assumed rate of return on plan assets, Ct is the normal cost contribution in a given year t, and Bt 
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Alabama ERS 2021 2022 2028 2031
Alabama Teachers 2021 2022 2029 2035
Alaska PERS † * 2021 2023 2021 2023
Alaska Teachers † * 2022 2025 2022 2025
Arizona Public Safety Personnel 2021 2022 2038 2047
Arizona SRS † 2023 2025 2055 > 2100
Arkansas PERS 2024 2026 2040 2061
Arkansas Teachers 2026 2030 2038 2054
California PERF † 2026 2029 2036 2064
California Teachers † 2025 2029 2071 > 2100
Chicago Teachers 2021 2023 2046 2066
City of Austin ERS 2021 2023 2029 2036
Colorado Municipal 2025 2027 2029 2032
Colorado School 2022 2025 2029 2036
Colorado State 2022 2023 2027 2031
Connecticut SERS 2017 2017 2021 2023
Connecticut Teachers 2019 2020 2030 2038
Contra Costa County 2027 2031 > 2100 > 2100
DC Police & Fire 2027 2030 2063 > 2100
DC Teachers 2037 > 2100 2042 2056
Delaware State Employees 2026 2030 2033 2042
Denver Employees 2026 2029 2035 2046
Denver Schools 2027 2033 2038 2063
Duluth Teachers 2021 2023 2029 2035
Fairfax County Schools 2022 2024 2047 2070
Florida RS † 2030 2040 > 2100 > 2100
Georgia ERS † 2021 2024 2025 2028
Georgia Teachers 2027 2033 2037 2053
Hawaii ERS 2020 2022 2028 2031
Houston Firefighters 2029 2035 2042 2076
Idaho PERS 2027 2032 2075 > 2100
Illinois Municipal 2030 2037 2039 2056
Illinois SERS 2016 2017 2021 2022
Illinois Teachers † 2019 2019 2029 2035
Illinois Universities † 2018 2019 2020 2021
Indiana PERF 2026 2030 2037 2048
Indiana Teachers 2018 2018 2023 2026





Appendix B – Year of Exhaustion, by Plan
6% 8%
Plan nameKansas PERS 2021 2022 2030 2034
Kentucky County 2020 2021 2027 2031
Kentucky ERS 2015 2015 2016 2017
Kentucky Teachers † 2020 2021 2027 2032
LA County ERS 2025 2028 2033 2042
Louisiana SERS 2019 2020 2028 2033
Louisiana Teachers 2018 2018 2021 2022
Maine Local 2030 2038 2039 2061
Maine State and Teacher 2021 2023 2029 2034
Maryland PERS 2024 2026 2033 2041
Maryland Teachers 2022 2024 2035 2044
Massachusetts SERS 2021 2023 2028 2033
Massachusetts Teachers 2019 2020 2025 2028
Michigan Municipal 2022 2025 2034 2046
Michigan Public Schools 2021 2023 2029 2036
Michigan SERS* 2021 2023 2021 2023
Minneapolis ERF* 2017 2018 2017 2018
Minnesota PERF 2022 2024 2027 2030
Minnesota State Employees † 2026 2030 2032 2037
Minnesota Teachers 2021 2023 2026 2030
Mississippi PERS 2018 2019 2022 2023
Missouri DOT and Highway Patrol 2016 2017 2019 2020
Missouri Local 2026 2029 2035 2050
Missouri PEERS 2028 2031 2051 2065
Missouri State Employees 2024 2026 2033 2041
Missouri Teachers 2023 2025 2051 > 2100
Montana PERS 2024 2026 2031 2038
Montana Teachers 2021 2023 2026 2029
Nebraska Schools 2027 2032 2035 2046
Nevada Police Officer and Firefighter † 2028 2032 2069 > 2100
Nevada Regular Employees † 2024 2027 2047 2065
New Hampshire Retirement System 2020 2021 2034 2042
New Jersey PERS † 2021 2022 2029 2034
New Jersey Police & Fire 2022 2025 2030 2037
New Jersey Teachers 2019 2020 2029 2036
New Mexico PERF 2023 2025 2037 2046
New Mexico Teachers 2020 2022 2026 2030
New York City ERS 2022 2024 2030 2035
New York City Teachers 2017 2017 2019 2021
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6% 8% 6% 8%
Plan name
Ongoing TerminationNew York State Teachers 2029 2038 2036 2049
North Carolina Local Government ‡ 2035 2049 2062 > 2100
North Carolina Teachers & State 2028 2034 2055 > 2100
North Dakota PERS 2028 2032 2036 2043
North Dakota Teachers 2022 2024 2032 2039
NY State & Local ERS † 2041 > 2100 2057 > 2100
NY State & Local Police & Fire † 2036 2053 2044 2065
Ohio PERS † 2025 2029 2034 2047
Ohio Police & Fire 2026 2030 2038 2049
Ohio School Employees † 2023 2026 2035 2047
Ohio Teachers † 2021 2023 2026 2029
Oklahoma PERS 2023 2025 2040 2062
Oklahoma Teachers 2018 2019 2027 2031
Oregon PERS 2026 2031 2030 2035
Pennsylvania School Employees † 2020 2021 2034 2049
Pennsylvania State ERS 2022 2024 2031 2044
Phoenix ERS 2021 2023 2038 2048
Rhode Island ERS 2019 2020 2022 2023
Rhode Island Municipal 2024 2027 2041 2054
San Diego County 2025 2028 2036 2048
San Francisco City & County 2025 2029 2034 2043
South Carolina Police 2019 2020 2026 2030
South Carolina RS 2020 2021 2037 2053
South Dakota PERS 2030 2036 2040 2056
St. Louis School Employees 2025 2031 2031 2045
St. Paul Teachers 2020 2021 2024 2026
Texas County & District 2029 2035 2035 2043
Texas ERS 2026 2031 2043 2058
Texas LECOS † 2018 2017 2020 2021
Texas Municipal 2029 2037 2049 > 2100
Texas Teachers † 2029 2035 2042 2084
TN Political Subdivisions 2026 2029 2036 2044
TN State and Teachers 2028 2034 2035 2044
University of California 2029 2034 2041 2059
Utah Noncontributory 2028 2032 2037 2047
Vermont State Employees 2023 2026 2035 2043
Vermont Teachers 2021 2022 2044 2065
Virginia Retirement System 2025 2028 2033 2040
Washington LEOFF Plan 1* 2031 2094 2031 2094
Washington LEOFF Plan 2 2030 2037 2045 2095
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6% 8% 6% 8%
Plan name
Ongoing Termination
Employees † ‡Washington PERS 1* 2018 2019 2018 2019
Washington PERS 2/3 2035 2045 2046 2059
Washington School Employees Plan 2030 2036 2047 2102
Washington Teachers Plan 1* 2019 2020 2019 2020
Washington Teachers Plan 2/3 2031 2035 2056 > 2100
West Virginia PERS 2025 2028 2035 2044
West Virginia Teachers 2017 2018 2021 2022
Wisconsin Retirement System † 2034 2063 2036 > 2100
Wyoming Public Employees 2026 2030 2043 2066
Total 2023 2033 2025 2041
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† Uses actual data. 
* Denotes closed plan.
‡ For analysis of both North Carolina plans, assets are at market level as of 12/31/2009.  Estimates for North 
Carolina Teachers and State Employees (TSERS) are based on the results for North Carolina Local Government 
System (LGERS), which has a similar funded level and normal cost to that of the TSERS.
Source: Authors’ estimates from 2009 Actuarial Valuation Reports.




1  For example, see Perez-Pena (2010); Walsh (2010a, 
2010b); Neumann and Corkery (2011); and Varghese 
(2011).
2  Munnell, Aubry, and Quinby (2010).
3  Colorado, Minnesota, and South Dakota are 
widely-publicized exceptions.  Each of these states has 
reduced the cost-of-living adjustment for current retir-
ees.  These actions are being challenged in the courts.
4  See Rauh (2009, 2010).
5  The normal cost equals the annual contribution 
required to cover benefits accrued in that year.
6  Benefit payments as calculated under an Accumu-
lated Benefit Obligation (ABO) concept are paid solely 
out of existing assets and returns on those assets.   
7  See Rauh (2010).  The numbers presented in 
this brief differ from Rauh’s because of underlying 
assumptions.  While Rauh applies the same set of 
actuarial assumptions – generalized from the 10 
largest plans – to every plan in his sample, we apply 
the actual plan-specific assumptions to the 14 larg-
est plans: Arizona SRS, California PERF, California 
Teachers, Florida RS, Illinois Teachers, New Jersey 
PERS, NY State & Local ERS, NY State & Local Police 
& Fire, North Carolina Teachers and State Employees, 
Ohio PERS, Ohio Teachers, Pennsylvania School Em-
ployees, Texas Teachers, and Wisconsin Retirement 
System.  We assign smaller plans one of the 14 sets of 
assumptions by comparing calculated liabilities under 
each of the 14 assumption sets to the plan’s own re-
ported liability.  See Appendix A for more details.
8  This analysis uses actuarial assumptions and plan 
designs reported in 2009 Actuarial Valuations and 
Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports.  We as-
sume that plans retain their 2009 plan designs going 
forward.
9  The other plans in this category include closed 
plans – Minneapolis ERF, Washington PERS 1, Wash-
ington Teachers Plan 1 – and smaller plans – Mis-
souri DOT and Highway Patrol, Mississippi PERS, 
Texas LECOS, and West Virginia Teachers.
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